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ABSTRACT
The Cryogenic On-orbit Liquid Depot - Storage, Acquisition
and Transfer (COLD-SAT) satellite presents some unique safety
issues. The feasibility study conducted at the NASA Lewis
Research Center desired a systems safety program that would be
involved from the initial design in order to eliminate and/or
control the inherent hazards. Because of this, a hazards analysis
method was needed that: (i) identified issues that needed to be
addressed for a feasibility assessment; and (2) identified all
potential hazards that would need to be controlled and/or
eliminated during the detailed design phases. This report
presents the developed analysis method as well as the results
generated for the COLD-SAT system.
I. Introduotion/Unique Requirements
The Cryogenic On-Orbit Liquid Storage, Acquisition, and
Transfer (COLD-SAT) satellite presents some unique considerations
from a safety perspective. NASA Lewis Research Center has
conducted feasibility studies for this free-flying orbital
experiment with a planned launch by an expendable launch vehicle
(ELY) in 1998. The purpose of COLD-SAT is to perform subcritical
liquid hydrogen (LH2) storage and transfer experiments under low-
gravity conditions to provide engineering data for future space
transportation missions. Gaseous hydrogen (GH 2) and gaseous helium
(GHe) are also proposed for use in various components of the
experiments.
Liquid hydrogen was chosen as the experimental fluid for two
reasons. First, its use as the primary liquid rocket propellant
makes it an obvious candidate (it has the highest specific impulse
of current rocket fuels). Second, it will provide more restrictive
(i.e. more conservative) data than other candidates, thereby making
the experiment results broader and more applicable to other fluids.
In addition to the usual safety concerns involved with
launching a space vehicle, COLD-SAT creates additional concerns
due to its use of cryogenic hydrogen. Ground and launch operations
are tremendously affected by this and will be modified in support
of safety evaluations. The use of hydrazine (N2H4), pyrotechnics,
and pressure vessels on the spacecraft also provide the need for
extensive safety input.
The approach used for this safety analysis is as follows.
First, a hazard definition matrix was developed. Second, hazard
definitions were defined in conjunction with this matrix. Next,
each of the defined hazards was classified based on its
applicability to the feasibility study. Finally, the hazards
considered to be major concerns were evaluated by the system
designers and safety engineers in order to identify proper design
approaches and safety considerations. Each of these items will be
discussed in detail in succeeding sections.
The intent of this analysis is to provide a baseline for the
COLD-SAT program safety efforts. The structure of the analysis is
such as to be very thorough, yet general in nature. Thus, the
analysis can be viewed as a complete analysis of the COLD-SAT
system and yet be applicable for use by any contractor that is
elected to continue the effort. This analysis, as defined and
presented in this report, should be used as the starting point for
future preliminary design safety efforts.
The bulk of the work is contained in the Appendices. Appendix
A contains all the hazard definitions - the detailed analysis of
the potential hazards of a system given a generic situation.
Appendix B contains the classification of the defined hazards, i.e.
whether or not the identified hazards required preliminary design
action. Both of these Appendices will be described more fully in
later sections.
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II. Matrix Description
The hazard definition matrix developed for the COLD-SAT
project is a three-dimensional matrix with the following matrix
dimensions: Cause Category, Hazard Group, and Operational Phase.
The initial matrix is shown in Figure i. The specific items, and
their definitions relative to COLD-SAT are:
Cause Cateqory:
A, Structural/Mechanical - any part of the structure or any
mechanical component or system
B, Hazardous Materials - LH2/GH2, N2H4, components or by-
products of batteries, processing
solvents, etc.
C , Environmental - shock/vibration, temperature
extremes, uninhabitable atmospheres,
excessive moisture (rain or conden-
sation), salt air, lightning, etc.
D Pneumatics/Pressurants - GHe, GH2, any ground operations
pressurant, etc.
E Electrical/Electronic - any electrical or electronic
component or system
F Ordnance - pyrotechnic valves, bolt/cable
cutters (no shape charges), etc.
G Propulsion - N2H4, the thrusters, and the
related plumbing and hardware
H Non-Ionizing Radiation - generated by high-energy radio
waves
Ground Support Equipment - any equipment used on the program
that will not be launched
Hazard Group:
I • Collision/Mech. Damage - an impact, with force, of
mechanical items
2. Corrosion - structural degradation of metallic
or non-metallic equipment (including
hydrogen embrittlement)
3
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Hazard Group (con't) :
• Contamination - the release, or cause of release,
of toxic, flammable, corrosive,
condensible, or particulate matter
,
Electrical Shock/Short - personnel injury or equipment
damage due to improper passage of
electrical current
5. Fire - rapid oxidation of combustibles -
combination of fuel, oxidizer, and
an ignition source
, Explosion/Implosion - a violent release or acceptance of
energy due to presBure differentials
. Temperature Extremes - burning or freezing of skin or
damage to equipment due to departure
of temperature from normal
Operational Phase:
1 Launch Site Modifications- safety assessment to launch site
ready
2 Subsystem Manufacture - material receipt to pack and load
complete
3 Transportation - pack and load complete to arrival
at CCAFS
4 Element Assembly - arrival at CCAFS to element test
start
5 Element Test - element test start to system
assembly start
6 System Integration - system assembly start to system
test start
7 System Test - system test start to pre-launch
servicing start
8 Pre-launch Service
- pre-launch servicing start to
countdown start
9 Countdown - countdown start to launch
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Operational Phase (con't) :
i0. Flight Phase I - launch to arrive park orbit
ii. Flight Phase II - arrive park orbit to arrive final
orbit
12. Payload Separation - arrive final orbit to payload
separation
The matrix was developed by taking applicable features of many
different system safety hazard analysis procedures in a manner that
makes it specific to COLD-SAT. Some of the references used in this
development were: NSTS 22254, "Methodology for Conduct of NSTS
Hazard Analyses;" S.O.I. 400-24, "Shuttle System Hazard Analysis
Procedure;" and, GDSS-TC-87-006A, "Titan/Centaur Hazard Analysis
Plan." The dimensions were chosen so as to be completely thorough.
Therefore, there is overlap in a number of areas. The cause
categories and hazard groups chosen are the items that are
foreseeable as necessary for a complete evaluation on the COLD-
SAT program from Feasibility Study through Launch.
III. Hazard Definition Approach
The potential hazards were addressed by asking the generic
question, "How can (cause category) cause (hazard group) during
(operational phase)?" In each case a numbering system was
developed to identify each matrix point according to the specific
dimensions it encompassed. For example, the first hazard
definition addresses the question "How can the
structural/mechanical system cause collision/mechanical damage
during launch site modifications?" From the matrix (Figure 2) it
is seen that collision/mechanical damage is the 'I' row (hazard
group); structural/mechanical is the 'A' column (cause category);
and, launch site modifications is the 'I' operational phase.
Therefore, this definition is given the title of I.A.I.I, with the
final 'i' added to signify the first (of potentially others)
definition.
The answer to the generic questions provided the substance of
each hazard definition. The definitions were not developed until
a deep understanding of the entire COLD-SAT system was obtained.
In addition, prior knowledge of safety information for missile
systems and satellites (or "lessons learned") was used to help
obtain a baseline. The technical aspects of the definition were
arrived at based on sound engineering knowledge and the acquired
specific system knowledge. Each matrix point was viewed as an
independent entity (i.e. the definition derived for one operational
phase involving a certain cause category/hazard group did not
affect the derivation of a definition for another operational
phase). The definitions were then judged on their applicability
to the COLD-SAT program and its various design phases. Certain
hazard definitions cannot physically occur on the COLD-SAT system.
These were judged to be "not applicable to COLD-SAT." All the
remaining hazard definitions are applicable to COLD-SAT and will
need to be responded to at some point in the design. The intent
of this analysis was to determine which of these definitions need
a design response as part of the feasibility study. Therefore,
these definitions needed to be classified as either "not a safety
concern for feasibility study" or "safety concern that should be
addressed during preliminary design." The difference between these
two classifications was that the second provided issues that the
systems' designers would account for in the preliminary design.
The first classification was used to baseline issues that will need
to be addressed during future phases but are not unique enough or
complex enough to require a design response during the feasibility
study.
Figure 2 shows the completed hazard matrix and Appendix A1
provides all of the hazard definitions and their respective
classification. The coding system used for classification is as
follows:
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+ Not applicable to COLD-SAT
- Not a safety concern for feasibility study
* Safety concern that should be addressed
preliminary design
during
The structure of the matrix provides for 756 individual cause
category/hazard group/operational phase definitions (9X7XI2). Each
of these matrix points, however, is not applicable to COLD-SAT.
Fourteen (14) cause category/hazard group pairs were deemed to be
not applicable during any operational phase. A total of forty (40)
specific definitions were also deemed to be not applicable.
Therefore, a total of 208 potential hazard definitions are not
applicable to COLD-SAT reducing the number of potential hazard
situations evaluated to 588 definitions. Of these, 408 are not a
safety concern for the feasibility study leaving 140 hazard
definitions that are a safety concern and should be addressed
during the preliminary design. These 140 hazard definitions are
indicated on the matrix with the number that corresponds to the
operational phase being addressed in that definition. The cause
category/hazard group pairs that are marked with "N/A" do not have
any definitions since it can not be envisioned how such a situation
could arise during the COLD-SAT program. The pairs marked with an
"@" have definitions, but the definitions are either not a safety
concern or they are not applicable to the COLD-SAT program.
756 Matrix Points - Potential Hazard Definitions
208
408
140
756
Not Applicable for COLD-SAT
(14 cause category/hazard groups + 40)
Not a safety concern for feasibility study
Safety concern that should be addressed during
preliminary design
IV. Classi£ioationAp_roaoh
There are 140 hazard definitions that are classified as a
"safety concern that should be addressed during preliminary
design." Not all of these safety concerns have great impacts on
the design, complexity, and/or cost of COLD-SAT. Therefore, a
second classification system was developed in order to determine
which of the identified hazards are major concerns for a
feasibility study. The basic classification scheme was defined as:
(1) a major safety concern for preliminary design; (2) a minor
safety concern for preliminary design; or, (3) addressed during
feasibility study.
The rationale for classifying these 140 hazard definitions
into one of the categories was based on a number of factors.
First, if an operation will be large in scope in the design effort,
it was classified as a major concern. An example of this is the
case of the ordnance used in this system. Although none of the
proposed ordnance is believed to be of the "Category A" type
(catastrophic in and of itself), the ordnance design effort is a
major consideration due to the work involved in compiling the list
of uses, evaluating the effects of operation on other functions,
and evaluating power requirements and effects. Secondly, if an
operation provides unique safety concerns, or is of catastrophic
nature of itself or in its timing (i.e. during launch), it was
classified as a major concern. The prime example of this is the
use and handling of the liquid hydrogen. Thirdly, if an operation
has safety requirements specifically mandated, it was considered
to be addressed during the feasibility study. This is the case in
the propulsion system design where it is required (by ESMCR 127-
1 paragraph 3.11) that two barriers be present between the
hydrazine and the catalyst bed until after launch. Some of the
hazards were only partially addressed in this manner and therefore
have been dually classified. All remaining hazards were classified
as a minor safety concern. This is not to say that these hazards
are not of a programmatic concern, but that normal pre-launch
safety analysis and review methods will address these items at
future phases and these methods will not greatly affect the design,
complexity, and/or cost of the system.
COLD-SAT H_zards Analysi@ S_f_ty Concerns Ca_eqories
* Addressed during Feasibility Study
- incorporated into design
* Minor safety concern for preliminary design 106
*Partially addressed; remainder is minor safety concern 19
* Major safety concern for preliminary design 11
*Partially addressed; remainder is major safety concern __2
TOTAL COLD-SAT FEASIBILITY STUDY SAFETY CONCERNS
125
1__/3
140
I0
Reasons for Classification as a Major Safety Concern:
- effort involved to eliminate or control hazard (design effort
and/or safety effort)
- timing of potential hazard occurrence (i.e. during countdown or
launch)
- scope of potential hazard (i.e. catastrophic result)
- unique safety requirements
All items identified as a safety concern are to be tracked
throughout the program's operation. This safety analysis is
designed to be used at the various stages of the program as a
method of thoroughly itemizing hazards and preparing for various
safety reviews.
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V. Major Safety Concerns
A hazard was considered to be a major safety concern if it
met any of the criteria presented in the preceding section.
Hazards identified as a minor safety concern will be important
during the various future design stages but are not considered to
be "drivers" at the feasibility study phase of the program.
The following thirteen (13) definitions for a cause
category/hazard group/operational phase were identified as areas
that present major safety concerns:
The Structural/Mechanical system causing Collision/Mechanical
damage during Countdown (I.A.9.1)
* Any component on the spacecraft or associated ground support
equipment could cause mechanical damage if it failed prior to
or during countdown. The potential hazard is that the failure
goes undetected and the launch occurs. The safety engineer
would rely on adequate designs, testing and quality assurance
to assure that failures will not occur. Furthermore, it is
critical that there are enough detection methods to alert the
launch team to any failure.
The Structural/Mechanical system causing Collision/Mechanical
damage during Flight Phase I (I.A.10.1)
* During flight phase I, the greatest amount of stress and
vibration will normally occur. Any of the satellite
components could fail mechanically or structurally and cause
collision or mechanical damage. The system safety engineer
must rely on adequate design, testing and quality assurance
to assure that failures will not occur. If a failure occurs
during flight phase I, there is no option for evasive or
corrective actions.
Ground Support Equipment causing an Electrical Shock/Short during
Launch Site Modifications (4.I.I.I)
* The launch site is considered ground support equipment and
there will be many uses of electrical power on the launch
site. System safety will evaluate the proposed launch site
modifications during preliminary design to determine the
potential for electrical shocks/shorts during any operation.
Pneumatics causing a Fire during Pre-launch Service (5.D.8.1)
* GH2 is to be loaded prior to launch. This will require all
electrical service in the area to be terminated or have only
spark proof electrical components in use during GH2 loading.
Pad/area safety plans will address the non-mission-unique
safety requirements; ESMCR 127-1, chapter 5 is applicable.
The mission-unique activities will be conducted via safety
approved procedures.
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The Structural/Mechanical system causing an Explosion during Pre-
launch Service (6.A.8.1)
* There will be many pressure vessels used during pre-launch
services that could explode/implode as a result of
structural/mechanical damage. The pressures and time-lines,
as well as the potential for structural/mechanical damage,
need to be considered during preliminary design. Pad/area
safety plans will address the non-mission-unique safety
requirements; ESMCR 127-1, chapter 5 is applicable. The
mission-unique activities will be conducted via safety
approved procedures.
Pneumatics causing an Explosion during Element Tests (6.D.5.1)
* There will be many element tests requiring pneumatics that
have the potential for causing explosions/implosions. Test
plans/procedures will be required for all testing. Design
factors of safety need to be considered during the preliminary
design of the pressure vessels that will be included on the
satellite. System safety will consider all tests for
potential safety impacts. Upon determination that a test has
potential for pneumatics causing explosions/implosions, the
safety engineer will assure that appropriate safety measures
are known and in place.
Pneumatics causing an Explosion during System Tests (6.D.7.1)
* There will be many system tests requiring pneumatics that have
the potential for causing explosions/implosions. Test
plans/procedures will be required for all testing. Design
factors of safety need to be considered during the preliminary
design of the pressure vessels that will be included on the
satellite. System safety will consider all tests for
potential safety impacts. Upon determination that a test has
potential for pneumatics causing explosions/implosions, the
safety engineer will assure that appropriate safety measures
are known and in place.
The Electrical/Electronics system causing an Explosion during
Launch Site Modifications (6.E.I.I)
* The launch site will require explosion-proof electrical boxes
on any level that may encounter LH2/GH2. This may require a
major launch site modification to accommodate the handling of
LH2/GH2.
Ordnance causing an Explosion during Pre-launch Service (6.F.7.1)
* A project list for the desired pyrotechnic applications needs
to be compiled and the applications and installation sequence
should be considered early in the design. System safety
should be a primary contributor to this effort.
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Ordnance causing an Explosion during Countdown (6.F.8.1)
* The sequence of ordnance activation needs to be considered
early in the design to assure an adequate supply of power and
to evaluate whether the ordnance firing will impact other
functions.
Ordnance causing an Explosion during Flight Phase I (6.F.9.1)
* The sequence of ordnance activation needs to be considered
early in the design to assure an adequate supply of power and
to evaluate whether the ordnance firing will impact other
functions.
Ordnance causing an Explosion during Flight Phase II (6.F.10.1)
* The sequence of ordnance activation needs to be considered
early in the design to assure an adequate supply of power and
to evaluate whether the ordnance firing will impact other
functions.
Ordnance causing an Explosion during Payload Separation (6.F.II.I)
* The sequence of ordnance activation needs to be considered
early in the design to assure an adequate supply of power and
to evaluate whether the ordnance firing will impact other
functions.
The next step was to identify the systems that each of these
hazards applies to. Following the system identification,
identification of safety considerations for each hazard was
accomplished.
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VI. System Design Approaoh to Major Safety Concerns
By combining the information in the preceding sections a
listing of the major safety concerns for each subsystem has been
compiled. The following are these lists:
STRUCTURAL SYSTEM:
* The structural system will be designed to withstand the stress
and vibration encountered during flight phase I. In addition, the
design will keep spacecraft bending within the allowable payload
envelope, thus avoiding contact with the faring.
* Adequate testing will be performed to assure that spacecraft
structural or mechanical failures will not occur and adequate
controls will be mandated to assure conformances to the design.
GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT SYSTEM:
* Non-mission-unique activities will follow the safety requirements
of ESMCR 127-1.
* Mission-unique activities will be conducted via safety approved
procedures.
* Pressure vessels will be designed to the requirements of MIL-STD-
1522A.
* Adequate design, testing, and quality assurance will be performed
to assure that mechanical ground support equipment failures will
not occur.
* Detection methods to alert the launch team.to any failure will
be provided.
* All proposed launch site modifications will be evaluated by
safety to determine the potential for hazards during any operation.
* All electrical service in the area will be terminated or have
only spark-proof electrical components in use during GH2 loading;
LH2 will be remotely loaded.
* The launch site will require explosion-proof electrical boxes on
any level that may encounter LH2/GH2.
OPERATIONS:
* Non-mission-unique activities will follow the safety requirements
of ESMCR 127-i.
* Mission-unique activities will be conducted via safety approved
procedures.
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* Mission and ground pressures and time-lines, and their hazard
potential, will be evaluated by safety and submitted to range
safety for analysis.
* The application and installation sequence of all pyrotechnic
applications will be considered early in the design. Also, the
sequence of ordnance activation will be evaluated to assure an
adequate supply of power and to assess the impact of ordnance
firing on other spacecraft functions.
EXPERIMENT SYSTEM:
* Mission-unique activities will be conducted via safety approved
procedures.
* Mission pressures and time-lines will be compiled.
* Pressure vessels will be designed at a minimum to the
requirements of MIL-STD-1522A.
* All test plans and procedures will be evaluated and approved by
safety for all testing.
* A project list of the desired pyrotechnic applications will be
compiled (including sequence of activation).
PROPULSION SYSTEM:
* Mission pressures and time-lines will be compiled.
* Pressure vessels will be designed to the requirements of MIL-STD-
1522A.
* All test plans and procedures will be evaluated and approved by
safety for all testing.
POWER SYSTEM:
* A project list of the desired pyrotechnic applications will be
compiled (including sequence of activation).
All of the above safety considerations have become a part of
the feasibility study design and the resulting baselined
spacecraft. Obviously, there will be additional safety
considerations as the program progresses - these should precipitate
from this baseline analysis.
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VII. Specific Safety Issues
Structural Design Considerations
If the structural/mechanical system caused collision or
mechanical damage at any point prior to the countdown, there would
be the opportunity for corrective action at a later time. At
countdown, however, this opportunity does not exist. Therefore,
it is imperative that any hazard of this type be detected during
the countdown. The timing of this event makes it a major safety
concern. Thus, the structure subsystem must have adequate design
and testing to avoid any hazard, as well as adequate quality
assurance programs. Secondly, the ground support equipment must
provide adequate detection methods that will alert the launch team
to any improper conditions.
The spacecraft and launch vehicle will encounter the greatest
amount of stress and vibration during flight phase I. Therefore,
this is the "worst-case" that must be designed for. The design
must include accommodations for bending within the payload envelope
as well as for the stress levels to be reached at this time. An
adequate design and testing program and proper quality assurance
provisions must be made.
Launch Site Modifications
Due to the unique nature of COLD-SAT, extensive work will be
done in the area of launch site modifications. The amount and
duration of this work combine to make the launch site modifications
a major safety concern. Since the bulk of this work will be
accomplished at later design phases, the only safety consideration
that can be itemized at this time is that all modifications desired
will be done in accordance with the requirements of ESMCR 127-1.
Furthermore, all modifications will be approved by range safety and
the launch site contractor.
The launch site modifications will be handled by providing a
COLD-SAT "mission kit" at the start of preparations for the launch.
This "kit" will be comprised of the plans, procedures, and hardware
necessary to accomplish all the agreed upon modifications.
GH2 r GHe I and N2H4 Loading Considerations
The loading of GH2, GHe, and N2H4 during pre-launch servicing
presents a major safety concern, in addition to requiring major
launch site modifications. At the time of loading, either all
electrical service in the area will have to be terminated, or all
components in use at this time will be required to be spark-proof.
Range safety (in accordance with ESMCR 127-1) will approve all
activities and will approve all plans and procedures. A
significant effort is needed to design the modifications to assure
17
safe operations.
The ground operations plan calls for the GHe to be loaded in
the Hazardous Processing Facility (HPF) using existing facilities
and servicing hardware. The N2H4 will also be loaded in the HPF.
The N2H4 system consists of flight qualified pressure vessels (at
pressures higher than COLD-SAT is proposing) and will also use
existing facilities and equipment. Access to the N2H4 is provided
through the fairing should downloading of the propellant be
required.
Pressure V_@_el De@iqn Cqnsidera_iQns
The use of pressure vessels is a major safety concern. COLD-
SAT uses pressure vessels in its experiment, its propulsion system,
and in its ground support equipment. The major concern will occur
during pre-launch service when the vessels are pressurized or
during element and system tests. It is imperative that these
vessels be designed with adequate factors of safety. Range safety
has suggested designing to the requirements of MIL-STD-1522A. In
addition, the pressure time-line must be evaluated and all
procedures and plans must be approved by safety. Adequate safety
measures will be followed, including those in ESMCR 127-1. The
potential for structural or mechanical damage, and the resulting
hazards, will also be evaluated.
The pressure vessel designs are in accordance with the
following (although these are not necessarily requirements):
Pressure Vessel qtv specification
GH2 Vaporizers 2
GHe Bottles (experiment) 2
N2H4 Bottles 4
GHe Pressurant Tanks 2
LH2 Supply Tank 1
LH2 Small Receiver Tank 1
LH2 Large Receiver Tank 1
MIL-STD-1522A
MIL-STD-1522A
MIL-STD-1522A, flight qualified
MIL-STD-1522A, flight qualified
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,
Section VIII, Division 1
ASMEBoiler and Pressure Vessel Code,
Section VIII, Division 1
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,
Section VIII, Division 1
LH2 Handlinq Considerations
The loading of the LH2 during pre-launch servicing presents
the major safety concern, in addition to requiring major launch
site modifications. Range safety (in accordance with ESMCR 127-
i) will approve all activities and will approve all plans and
procedures. A significant effort is needed to design the
modifications to assure safe operations.
The launch site will require explosion-proof electrical boxes
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and equipment on any level that may encounter LH2. This is a
feature that is provided by Complex 36, due to its Centaur
facilities. In order to minimize safety concerns, Centaur systems
will be used as much as possible. In addition, loading will be
remotely monitored and controlled from the Launch Complex Control
Room.
Although the LH2 Supply Tank will be "locked-up" at T-95 sec,
the capability to vent and drain will remain until the commit to
launch.
Pyrotechnic Usaqe/Con_rol Considera_i0n8
Ordnance will be used in a couple of COLD-SAT applications.
It will be used as part of the power system (solar array
deployment) and the experiment system (GHe Purge Bag Vent).
Although no projected application involves high-explosive devices
(irrespective of Flight Termination System), the proper functioning
of the respective pyrotechnics is essential to maintaining safety.
Therefore, a list of all uses of ordnance is mandatory as is an
evaluation that addresses the availability of adequate power, the
sequence of activation, and the impact on other systems that the
ordnance firing will have.
Due to the complexity of the COLD-SAT satellite, it was
impossible to completely eliminate pyros that will not be
accessible to ground personnel once the spacecraft is assembled.
The occurrences were minimized to the activation of the GHe Purge
Bag Vent. These pyros as well as any pyro that controls a
hazardous function (i.e. LH2 flow) will be operated from a
dedicated pyro control box. This box will isolate the pyros
electrically until F-I day, at which time the flight actuation
cable will be installed to arm the pyros. The pyro control box
will be accessible through the fairing access doors.
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VXIa. rllght Tezminatlon System
The requirements of ESMCR 127-1 chapter 4 specify the use of
a flight termination system (FTS) unless a waiver is granted by
Range Safety. For the COLD-SAT Feasibility Study, it was assumed
that an FTS was needed and the spacecraft system was designed
accordingly.
The need for an FTS arises based on two concerns: (1) an
intact impact of a suborbital spacecraft following premature
separation from the launch vehicle; and (2) independent propulsive
potential of the spacecraft. Due to the relative size of the RCS
thrusters on COLD-SAT, it can be shown that the spacecraft will
effectively have no independent propulsive potential. Therefore,
the FTS concern is with an intact impact of the COLD-SAT LH2 and
N2H4 vessels.
The FTS that was baselined for COLD-SAT is referred to as an
Inadvertent Separation Destruct System (ISDS). This type of system
is attached to the launch vehicle and connected to the payload by
"break-wires." These "break-wires" will trigger the destruct
mechanism if the payload should separate from the launch vehicle
prior to the command to do so. The actual system baselined for
COLD-SAT is the Martin Marietta Explosive Formed Projectile system.
This system has flown on all the commercial Titans and will fly on
the Titan IV/Centaur. The system is proposed to be mounted on the
Centaur payload adapter thereby eliminating the concern of an
inadvertent on-orbit firing.
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VIII. Conclusion/Recommondatlons/Issues
The conclusion reached following this feasibility study safety
analysis is that there does not appear to be any safety-related
reasons that would make the COLD-SAT program non-feasible. None
of the major safety concerns are technical constraints. All of the
safety considerations can be accomplished, albeit with some effort
and cost, but do not appear to require extraordinary measures.
It is recommended that this analysis be used as the starting
point for all future safety analyses. The analysis and database
produced are designed to be utilized by other organizations
involved with the COLD-SAT program.
However, some simple changes to the hazard matrix would be
helpful in the future. First, the third dimension, operational
phase, would be more accurate if described as program phase.
Secondly, the program phases themselves would be more useful from
a safety standpoint if they were changed as follows:
FROM T__O
i0. Flight Phase I Launch
ii. Flight Phase II Payload Separation
12. Payload Separation On Orbit
where launch would indicate the span from lift-off to payload
separation. This would allow the evaluation of on-orbit safety
issues such as end-of-life operations and space debris.
The only issue or concern that arose during the analysis dealt
with the lack of concrete answers available from range safety. It
is understandable that they cannot provide definite answers unless
a firm design exists. Therefore, suggestions (not answers)
received from range safety became answers to questions and part of
the design. If all future work remains within the boundaries
established by the feasibility study there should not be any
additional safety issues. However, if the design is significantly
altered, system safety should evaluate the proposed changes for
programmatic impacts. Therefore, it is imperative that all future
work be done with both system safety's and range safety's
knowledge, support, and approval.
21
APPENDIX A1
Hazard Definitions
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